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International Biomedical Law in Search for Its Normative Status 
Dr Atina Krajewska* 
 
Summary: 1. Introduction. 2. International biomedical law in light of fragmentation of international 
law: a) Institutional proliferation of biomedical law; b) International biomedical law as a ‘self-
contained regime’? c) Relative normativity of international biomedical law? 3. International 
biomedical law in the context of global legal pluralism. 4. Conclusions: studies into global 
biomedical law? 
 
Abstract: The broad and multifaceted problem of global health law and global health governance 
has been attracting increasing attention in the last few decades. The global community has failed to 
establish international legal regime that deals comprehensively with the ‘technological revolution’. 
The latter has posed complex questions to regions of the world with widely differing cultural 
perspectives. At the same time, an increasing number of governmental and non-state actors have 
become significantly involved in the sector. They use legal, political, and other forms of decision-
making that result in regulatory instruments of contrasting normative status. Law created in this 
heterogeneous environment has been said to be fragmented, inconsistent, and exacerbating 
uncertainties. Therefore, claims have been made that a centralised and institutionalised system 
would help address the problems of transparency, legitimacy and efficiency. Nevertheless, little 
scholarly consideration is paid to the normative status of international biomedical law. This paper 
explores whether formalisation and ‘constitutionalisation’ of biomedical law are indeed inevitable for 
its establishment as a separate regulatory regime. It does so by analysing the proliferation of 
biomedical law in light of two the theory of fragmentation and the theory of global legal pluralism. 
Investigating the problem in this way helps determine the theoretical framework and methodology of 
future studies of biomedical law at the international level. This in turn should help its future 
development in a more consistent and harmonised manner.  
Keywords: Biomedical Law, Health Law, Public International Law, Genetics, Soft law, 
Globalisation, Fragmentation of International Law 
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‘There is no one issue or perspective that provides 
the path to the future. Rather we must seek new 
connections and new patterns (…) new 
possibilities.’1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The broad and multifaceted problem of global health law and global health governance has 
been attracting increasing attention in the last few decades.2 Global health law is usually 
understood to regulate aspects of infectious and non-communicable diseases, international trade 
and control of safety of health services, food and pharmaceuticals, addictive substances such as 
tobacco and narcotics, as well as biomedical science.3 The regulation of biotechnology and 
                                                 
* Lecturer in Law, Law School, University of Cardiff (Cardiff, UK), E-mail for correspondence: 
Krajewskaa@cardiff.ac.uk. Published in: (2012) 36  Revista de Derecho y Genoma Humano: Law and the 
Human Genome Review, 121-143. 
1
 B. Bennett. 2008. Health Law's Kaleidoscope: Health Law Rights in a Global Age, Ashgate, 119. 
2
 O. Aginam. 2005. Global health governance: international law and public health in a divided world, University 
of Toronto Press Inc.; L. O. Gostin and E. A. Mok, Grand challenges in global health governance, British 
Medical Bulletin 2009; 90: 7–18, DOI:10.1093/bmb/ldp014; J.Prah Ruger, Normative Foundations of Global 
Health Law, Georgetown Law Journal, 2008; 96:423. L.O. Gostin, A. L. Taylor, Global Health Law: A Definition 
and Grand Challenges, Public Health Ethics 2008; 1: 1: 53–63; B. Bennett. 2008. Health Law's Kaleidoscope: 
Health Law Rights in a Global Age, Ashgate. 
3
 See F. Grad. Public Health Law: Its Forms, Functions, Futures and Ethical Parameters, International Digest 
of Health Legislation 1998; 49: 19-40. This paper will often refer to global health law, and occasionally to 
environmental law. This is because the latter two fields have so far attracted much more academic attention; 
since they are overlapping analogies can be sought and conclusions can be drawn for international biomedical 
law.   
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biomedicine constitutes a special – extremely fast-changing and contentious – area within public 
health law. The application of new technologies in biomedicine has posed complex questions to 
regions of the world with widely differing cultural perspectives. Despite many attempts to regulate 
this area, the global community has failed to establish international legal regime that deals 
comprehensively with the ‘technological revolution’4. At the same time, an increasing number of 
governmental and non-state actors have become significantly involved in the sector. Non-state 
actors especially, including a wide range of nongovernmental organisations, agencies, foundations, 
research and other professional networks, religious groups, and for-profit organisations such as 
pharmaceutical industry, have had an increasingly powerful influence on international health policy 
and global lawmaking.5 The members of this complex network use legal, political, and various other 
forms of decision-making that result in regulatory instruments of contrasting normative status. 
Law created in this heterogeneous environment has been said to be developing in a 
fragmented, uncoordinated, amorphous, hence inconsistent, inefficient, and incomplete manner.6 
Such a fractured legal process exacerbates uncertainties about the legal regime that governs 
biotechnological developments. Therefore, proposals have been formulated for more effective 
separation7, coordination8, or subsumption9 of different regulatory remits. Indeed, claims have been 
                                                 
4
 R. Brownsword. 2008. Rights, Regulation and the Technological Revolution, Oxford University Press. 
5
 K. Buse, G. Walt, Global public–private health partnerships: Part I — a new development in health? Bulletin 
of the World Health Organization 2000, 78: 549–561 and K. Buse, G. Walt, Global public–private health 
partnerships: Part II — what are the issues for global governance? Bulletin of the World Health Organization 
2000, 78: 699–709. 
6
 A. Taylor. Governing Globalization of Public Health, The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2004, 500-508: 
500, J.P Ruger, D. Yach. The Global Role of the World Health Organization, Global Health Governance 2008 
/2009, 2:2. 
7
 J.Williams. UNESCO’s proposed declaration on bioethics and human rights. A bland compromise, 
Developing World Bioethics. Special Issue: Reflections on the UNESCO Draft Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights 2005; 5: 210-5. 
8
 J.Prah Ruger, D. Yach. The Global Role of the World Health Organization, Global Health Governance. 2008 
/2009, 2:2: 1-11; A.Taylor, Global governance, international health law and WHO: looking towards the future, 
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made that a formalised, centralised, and institutionalised system would help address the problems 
of transparency and legitimacy and deal with bioethical issues at the international level more 
effectively. These claims usually rest on an implicit assumption that international norms concerning 
biotechnology and biomedicine can be recognised as a new type of autonomous regulatory regime 
– in statu nascendi – that is on its way to its constitutionalisation.10 However, despite the growing 
belief that conventional international law can serve as a dynamic tool for multilateral health 
cooperation in an increasingly interdependent world, little scholarly consideration is paid to the 
institutional basis and the normative status of international biomedical law.  
This paper aims to address this gap. In particular it explores whether formalisation, 
centralisation, and ‘constitutionalisation’ of biomedical law are indeed inevitable for its 
establishment as a separate regulatory regime. It does so by analysing the institutional and 
normative proliferation of biomedical law at the global level in light of two theories of public 
international law, namely the theory of fragmentation11 and the theory of global legal pluralism12. 
While the first addresses the recent developments in international law; the second offers an 
                                                                                                                                                    
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 2002, 80: 12; A.Taylor, Governing Globalization of Public Health, The 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 2004, 32: 3, 500-508: 500. 
9
 T.A. Faunce, Will International Human Rights Subsume Medical Ethics? Intersections in the UNESCO 
Universal Bioethics Declaration, Journal of Medical Ethics 2009, 31:173. Cf.: R. Ashcroft, Could Human Rights 
Supersede Bioethics?, Human Rights Law Review 2010, DOI: 10.1093/hrlr/ngq037. 
10
 R. Andorno, Dignity of the person in the light of international biomedical law, Medicina e Morale 2005; 1: 91-
105. Also: F. Francioni, Genetic Resources, Biotechnology and Human Rights: The International Legal 
Framework, EUI Working Paper LAW 2006; 17, available at: http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/6070. 
Accessed on 25.10.2010. [Accessed on 1 Nov 2010]. The problem of regimes’ collision has been extensively 
analysed by A. Fischer-Lescano, G.Teubner, Regime collisions: the vain search for legal unity in the 
fragmentation of global law, Michigan Journal of International Law 2004; 25: 999-1045. 
11
 M. Koskenniemi, P. Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 2002; 15:3:553-579. 
12
 A. Fischer-Lescano, G.Teubner,  Regime collisions: the vain search for legal unity in the fragmentation of 
global law, Michigan Journal of International Law 2004; 25: 999-1045. 
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analysis of the developments of law in general in the era of globalisation. Although not without 
limitations, both provide a helpful tool in addressing the issue of biomedical law and its normative 
status at the global level. Analysis of the current status and scope of challenges in terms of 
conventional perspectives upon legal regulation is considered alongside attempt to theorise the 
fluidity and complexity of the reality of the modern global condition made by scholars such as 
Günter Teubner and Martti Koskenniemi. Investigating the problem in this way helps determine the 
theoretical framework and methodology of future studies of biomedical law at the international level. 
This in turn should help its future development in a more consistent and harmonised manner. As 
these issues exceed the limits of an academic article, the modest aim of this paper is to bring to 
light a new dimension of analyses and clarify the agenda for future research.  
 
II. INTERNATIONAL BIOMEDICAL LAW IN LIGHT OF FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
a)  Institutional proliferation of biomedical law  
  
The universal influence of new technologies has undermined conventional territorial boundaries 
and emerged as global and common objects of regulation. Consequently, parts of medical, health 
and environmental law are predominantly set at supranational, international and transnational 
institutional levels.13 This has determined further developments. Firstly, more and more 
governmental organisations have taken interest in issues of health and biomedicine. The UN 
Commission for Human Rights, UNESCO, WHO, WTO, UNEP, and recently also the OECD have 
all contributed to the elaboration of international instruments in the rapidly evolving field of 
biomedical science. While the UN Commission for Human Rights has adopted resolutions 
pertaining to human rights and bioethics with implications for public health and biomedicine14, 
                                                 
13
 I-J. Sand. 2004. Polycontextuality as an Alternative to Constitutionalism. In: Transnational Governance ad 
Constitutionalism, Ch. Joerges, I-J. Sand, G. Teubner (eds), Hart Publishing: 55. 
14
 UN Commission for Human Rights, Resolution on Human Rights and Bioethics 2003/69, 2001/71, 1999/63, 
1997/71, 1993/91, available at: 
 6 
UNESCO was drafting the three major Declarations of 1997, 2003, and 2005.15 At the same time, in 
the years of the Human Genome Project (HGP), WHO started preparing separate, competing 
reports on genomics, health, and intellectual property rights.16 It was not until 2003 that the WHO 
and UNESCO established a special Inter-Agency Committee on Bioethics17 to address potential 
tensions and to facilitate dialogue and compliance between the documents issued by both 
organisations. Other conflicts, this time between the WTO and the WHO have been revealed in the 
context of disputes over access to medicines emerging in relation to the Doha Declaration18 on the 
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement19 and Public Health.20 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.RES.2001.71.En?Opendocument.  [Accessed 1 
Nov 2010]. 
15
 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (unanimously and by acclamation on 11 
Nov 1997), International Declaration on Human Genetic Data (16 Oct 2003), Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights (19 Oct 2005), available via: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-
sciences/themes/bioethics/about-bioethics/. [Accessed 29 Oct 2010].  
16
 E.g. WHO. Control of hereditary disorders: Report of WHO Scientific Meeting 1996, World Health Assembly 
Statement on “Cloning in Human Reproduction” 1997, WHO, Statement of the WHO Expert Consultation on 
New Developments in Human Genetics, 21 Jul 2000, WHO/HGN/WG/00.3, available at: 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2000/WHO_HGN_WG_00.3.pdf, Report of the Advisory Committee on Health 
Research: Genomics and World Health 2002, Review of Ethical Principles in Medical Genetics 2003; available 
via: http://www.who.int/topics/genetics/en/. [Accessed 29 Oct 2010]. 
17
 Member organizations are listed at: www.who.int/ethics/about/unintercomm/en/  
18
 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted in Doha, Qatar on 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2; available via: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm. Accessed on 29.10.2010 
19
 The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 Apr 1994, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm. [Accessed 29 Oct 2010]. 
20
 A. Fischer-Lescano, G.Teubner. Regime collisions: the vain search for legal unity in the fragmentation of 
global law, Michigan Journal of International Law 2004, 25: 999-1045. For a detailed discussion on the 
medicines decision: F.M. Abbott. The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the 
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These disputes serve as an example of tensions between different rationalities, intellectual 
traditions – and corporate logic – of different organisations within the ever expanding UN system, 
characterised by a multiplication of committees and sub-committees and new administrative 
structures such as programmes and funds.21 These complex structures are then supplemented by 
regional organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union which so far have 
probably been the most active and influential regulators of biomedicine and biotechnology 
worldwide.22 However, this is only a part of the overall picture of the international governance of 
biomedicine.  
The new emerging international health framework is no longer dominated by a few 
intergovernmental organisations, but consists of numerous global health actors; some with finance-
policy-operational functions23, and others with professional-standards-setting functions. Even 
business corporations seem to be accepting a more prominent role in international law.24 Again, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Protection of Public Health, American Journal of International Law 2005, 99: 317-358; D. J. Gervais. Trips, 
Doha and Traditional Knowledge, Journal of World International Property 2003, 6: 403-419. 
21
 The latest example of this institutional incoherence is the fight against HIV/AIDS. The Joint UN Programme 
on HIV and AIDS, UNAIDS, which was recently established, has been given responsibilities which should 
normally fall within the framework of the WHO mandate. Subsequently, the Global Fund, dedicated to the 
same goals, has been recently created outside the UN. See: P. de Sanarclens. 2007. The United Nation as a 
social and economic regulator, In Regulating Globalisation, Critical Approaches to Global Governance, P. de 
Sanarclens, A. Kazancigli (eds), United Nations University: 8-35. 
22
 Their regulatory activities are discussed below.   
23
 The World Economic Forum has sponsored deliberations about HIV/AIDS, tobacco control and vaccines to 
obesity. The UN Security Council has been involved in issues related to HIV/AIDS. Finally the private sector, 
for- and non-profit organisations developed as a force in international health as relatively new, yet important 
players. See:  J.P Ruger, D. Yach. The Global Role of the World Health Organization, Global Health 
Governance, 2008 /2009, 2:2: 1-11.  
24
 See: UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights with the adoption in 2003 of a 
set of norms of the responsibility of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to 
human rights, 26 Aug 2003 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2), available at: 
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non-state actors are equally active at regional levels.25 This complex network offers an institutional 
alternative which offsets the weight of states and intergovernmental organisations. Unfortunately, 
the proliferation of NGOs has increased the difficulty of achieving coherence and coordination in the 
social, economic, and humanitarian fields.26 The appearance of standard-setting organizations 
raises closely related questions with regard the scope of regulatory authority, as well as the 
legitimacy of grounds and enforcement.27 At the same time, rapid advances in science, coupled 
with strong promises of local medical and economic gains reveal competing ambitions between 
non-state actors.  
Such competition is well reflected in the regulatory activities of several non-governmental 
organisations undertaken at the end of the 20th - and the beginning of the 21st century. For instance, 
the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS)28 and the World Medical 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En. [Accessed 25 Oct 
2010]. 
25
 Eg. Regional non-state regulators in Europe include for instance: European Forum for Good Clinical 
Practice, European Medical Research Councils, European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology, 
European Committee for Standardization. 
26
 P. de Sanarclens. 2007. The United Nation as a social and economic regulator, In Regulating Globalisation, 
Critical Approaches to Global Governance, P. de Sanarclens, A. Kazancigli (eds), United Nations University: 8-
35. 
27
 N. Brunsson, B. Jacobsson 2000, A World of Standards, Oxford: Oxford University Press; H. Schepel, 2004, 
Constituting Private Governance Regimes: Standards Bodies in American Law, In: Transnational Governance 
and Constitutionalism, Joerges, Sand and Teubner (eds), Oxford: Hart Publishing: 161–88; P. Zumnbasen. 
Transnational Law, Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy, Research Paper 2008; 2: 4 
(originally in Encyclopedia of Comparative Law J. Smits (ed.) 2006). 
28
 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), International Ethical Guidelines for 
Biomedical Research involving human subjects (2002) (enumerating a set of ethical guidelines for biomedical 
research dealing with topics like confidentiality, informed consent, and the duty to provide health services). 
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Association (WMA)29, apart from adopting general rules concerning medical research involving 
human subjects, have both engaged with the developments in the science of genetics issuing 
respectively, the Declaration on Inuyama on Human Genome Mapping, Genetic Screening and 
Gene Therapy (1990), and the Statement on Genetics and Medicine (2005 and 2009).30 At the 
same time, the Ethical, Legal and Social Issues Committee of the Human Genome Organisation 
(HUOGO) prepared the Statement on the principled conduct of genetics research (1996) which had 
also played a role in shaping the debate and research practices about genetics.31 Parallel to the 
multitude of actors, whose status can only inadequately be reassigned to well-known public/private 
distinctions, the biomedical world is witnessing the emergence of a large, decentralized and non-
harmonized body of norms. 
This proliferation of multilateral institutions with overlapping ambitions and legal authority has 
resulted in the serious criticism that the multitude of international organisations sharing lawmaking 
authority with other actors reflects an increasingly fragmented, and incongruent global health 
agenda.32 As rightly summarised by Alan Taylor: ‘dramatic advances in the field of biomedical 
                                                 
29
 World Medical Association Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, Declaration of 
Helsinki, Jun1964 (as amended by 59th WMA General Assembly, Seoul, October 2008)(providing guidelines 
for medical professionals around the world who conduct experimental research with human subjects), 
available at http://www.wma.net/e/. [Accessed 29 Oct 2010].  
30
 WMA, Statement on Genetics and Medicine, Santiago, Chile, Oct 2005 and amended by the WMA General 
Assembly, New Delhi, India, Oct 2009, replaced the Declaration on the Human Genome Project, adopted by 
the 44th World Medical Assembly Marbella, Spain, Sep 1992; available at: 
http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/g11/index.html. [Accessed on 30 Oct 2010]. 
31
 Human Genome Organisation; Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Committee; Statement on the Principled 
Conduct of Genetics Research 1996, available at: 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/geneticsresearch.html. [Accessed 30 Oct 2010]. 
32
 J.P Ruger, D. Yach, The Global Role of the World Health Organization, Global Health Governance, 2008 
/2009, 2:2. L.O. Gostin, A. L. Taylor, Global Health Law: A Definition and Grand Challenges, Public Health 
Ethics 2008;1:1: 53–63; A. Taylor, Governing Globalization of Public Health, The Journal of Law, Medicine and 
Ethics, 2004; 500-508: 504. 
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science have recently triggered numerous, uncoordinated regional and global initiatives, which, 
while undertaken without meaningful consultation, coordination or planning, obscure rather than 
rationalised the global legal framework.’33 This development can be seen as an impediment rather 
than an incentive for international scientific co-operation, making it extremely difficult for doctors, 
researchers, and private companies to determine which governance regime is applicable in any 
particular case, and which prevails when conflicts occur. It may also become confusing for national 
legislators, who, when trying to regulate particular problems, look for clear and coherent 
international guidelines. Many differences in the legal requirements at the national level remain and 
militate against networking. Consequently, the proliferation and specialization of laws leads to a 
multiplication of standards and terminology.34 Quite apart from the varying interests of different 
societies, there are often ‘different starting points for the very idea of regulation’.35 This criticism 
carries direct parallels with a critique of public international law. Institutional proliferation of 
biomedical law at the international level resulting in potential tensions between regulatory 
instruments can be seen, either as a reflection, or an element of a wider phenomenon of 
                                                 
33
 A. Taylor. Governing Globalization of Public Health, The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 2004, 500-
508: 504. See also: J.P Ruger, D. Yach, The Global Role of the World Health Organization, Global Health 
Governance, 2008 /2009, 2:2. L.O. Gostin, A. L. Taylor, Global Health Law: A Definition and Grand 
Challenges, Public Health Ethics 2008;1:1: 53–63. 
 
34
 B.M. Knoppers, M. H Abdul-Rahman, and K. Bédard, Genomic Databases and International Collaboration, 
King’s Law Journal 2007; 18: 291–311; A. Cambon-Thomsen, C. Sallée, E. Rial-Sebbag and B.M. Knoppers, 
Populational Genetic Databases : Is a Specific Ethical and Legal Framework Necessary? GenEdit 2005; 3:1: 
1-13; S. MC Gibbons, J. Kaye. Governing Genetic Databases: Collection, Storage and Use, King’s Law 
Journal 2007; 18: 201–208. 
35
 M.D. Kirby, 1999. Human Freedom and Human Genome: The Ten Rules of Valencia, cited by: 
R.Brownsword. 2008. Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution, Oxford University Press: 295. 
Also: M.D. Kirby. The Human Genome Project – Promise and Problems, Journal of Contemporary Health Law 
and Policy 1994; 11:1.  
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‘fragmentation of international law’.36 The analysis of this phenomenon offers important insights into 
the development of the international biomedical law and its role within ‘general’ international law.   
 
b) International biomedical law as a ‘self-contained regime’? 
 
According to the special Study Group of the UN International Law Commission (ILC) chaired by 
Martti Koskenniemi, the phenomenon of fragmentation of international law is related with the 
increasing specialization and related autonomization of parts of society, called by sociologists 
‘functional differentiation’.37 Such differentiation has been accompanied by the emergence of 
specialized and (relatively) autonomous rules or rule-complexes, legal institutions, and spheres of 
legal practice that have no clear relationship to each other. From a tool dedicated to the regulation 
of formal diplomacy, international law has expanded to deal with the most varied kinds of 
international activity, from trade to environmental protection, from human rights to scientific and 
technological cooperation. This expansion has taken place in an uncoordinated fashion and 
resulted in diversity of international law both in substance and procedure.38  
In substance, international law is fragmented, firstly, along functionally defined issue-areas 
such as human rights law, trade law, environmental law, humanitarian law, criminal law and the law 
of the sea. These issue-areas, also referred to as ‘(self-contained) regimes’, often correspond to 
functionally specialized international organizations such as the WTO, UNEP, WIPO, ILO and WHO. 
Fragmentation of, or between, those regimes becomes particularly contentious when such 
functionally specialized regimes claim autonomy either from each other (say, the WTO disregarding 
the WIPO), or from general international law. Secondly, international law can be fragmented along 
                                                 
36
 International Law Commission, Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 58th Session ,Geneva May-Aug  2006, (A/CN.4/L.702), 
para. 483; available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/1_9.htm. [Accessed 5 Nov 2010] 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 J. Pauwelyn, 2009. Fragmentation of International Law, IN: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press.  
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geographical or regional lines (EU, NAFTA). Finally, these two forms of fragmentation can lead to a 
third, when parallel or conflicting norms or obligations in the same issue-area such as trade or 
environmental protection apply to the same states or subjects of international law. Thereafter, 
fragmentation in procedure arises most prominently in the context of multiple international courts 
and tribunals.39 The ILC Study Group acknowledged that the emergence of new and special types 
of law creates problems of coherence and consistency in the interpretation and development of 
international law; ‘[a]nswers to legal questions become dependent on whom you ask, what rule 
system is your focus on.’40 Each rule-complex or ‘regime’ comes with its own principles, its own 
form of expertise and its own ‘ethos’, not necessarily identical to the ethos of neighboring 
specialization. Very often new rules or regimes develop precisely in order to deviate from what was 
earlier provided by the general law. When such deviations become general and frequent, the unity 
of the law suffers.41  
However, the ILC concluded – echoing earlier works of Koskenniemi – that the emergence of 
special treaty-regimes has not seriously undermined legal security, predictability or the equality of 
legal subjects. International law is a decentralised system and as such has long had to face the 
problem of relating together a variety of rules derived from general treaties, specific treaties and 
customary law. What characterises international law is a strong presumption against normative 
conflict.42 It uses several generally accepted techniques of interpretation and conflict resolution 
                                                 
39
 A. Zimmermann, R. Hofmann (eds.) 2006. Unity and Diversity in International Law, Berlin: Duncker und 
Humblot. 
40
 International Law Commission, Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 58th Session , Geneva May-Aug  2006, (A/CN.4/L.702), 
para 365. 
41
 International Law Commission, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 58th Session, 
Geneva May-Aug  2006, (A/61/10, para. 14 (1)), Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006; II: 2.  
42
 M.Koskenniemi, P.Leino. Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, Leiden Journal of. 
International Law 2002; 15: 553-579. 
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such as the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali or lex posterior derogate legi priori.43 
Nevertheless, it has been noted that increasing attention is to be given to the collision of norms and 
regimes as well as the rules, methods and techniques for dealing with such collisions. These 
conclusions allow for some optimism as to the effects that the variety of legal rules may have on 
international biomedical law. However, they also shift the focus of attention onto ‘self-contained 
regimes’, for only such regimes, provided certain criteria are met, may seek precedence over 
general rules of international law. In light of these comments, it becomes crucial whether 
international biomedical law indeed constitutes a new ‘self-contained’ regime. A closer look at the 
definition of such regimes sheds doubt on any such assertion. 
A ‘self-contained regime’, as understood by the ILC, is a group of rules and principles 
concerned with a particular subject matter that is applicable as lex specialis, i.e. that is able to seek 
precedence in regard to general international law.44 Such special regimes often have their own 
institutions to administer the relevant rules. Firstly, they may be constituted by a special set of 
(secondary) rules concerning breach of a particular group of (primary) rules (e.g. diplomatic law).45 
Secondly, a special regime is formed by a set of special rules, including rights and obligations, 
relating to a special subject matter together with the rules for the creation, interpretation, 
application, modification, or termination of those rules. Such a special regime may emerge on the 
basis of a single treaty (e.g. a treaty on the regulation of the uses of a particular weapon or tobacco 
control), several treaties, or treaty plus non-treaty developments (such as subsequent practice or 
customary law). Thirdly, all the rules and principles that regulate a certain problem area may be 
                                                 
43
 These two Latin maxims translate to: law governing a specific subject matter overrides a law which only 
governs general matters and the later law replaces the earlier one. 
44
 A definition of a ‘self-contained regime’ can be found in the Report of the Study Group of the International 
Law Commission finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from 
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 13 Apr 2006 , UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 p. 1-256 and 18 
July 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 1-25. 
45
 J. Pauwelyn, 2009. Fragmentation of International Law, IN: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Heidelberg and Oxford University Press. 
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collected together and are referred to as ‘branches of international law’. Such collations presume to 
function in the manner of self-contained regimes, claiming to be regulated by their own principles. 
Expressions such as ‘law of the sea’, ‘humanitarian law’, ‘human rights law’, ‘environmental law’ 
and ‘trade law’, are used for mainly didactic purposes. 46  
It is clear from the foregoing that, at least at this point of time, it would be extremely difficult to 
argue that international biomedical law constitutes a ‘self-contained regime’. First of all, it is neither 
founded on any specific treaty outlining rights and obligations relating to specific subject matter, nor 
does it have a body of rules for the administration of primary rules. The same refers to any 
adjudicative body that would seek to interpret such rules and provide some kind of dispute 
resolution. There is no clear central coordinating institution either. This is despite the claims that the 
WHO would act as an umbrella health agency coordinating and convening legal and non-legal 
activities of different organisations providing thereby a more effective collective management.47 
Such claims are brought into question by the fact that the WHO has long been reluctant to pursue 
international law approaches to public health issues48 and that it was UNESCO who adopted the 
three most important international human rights acts in the area of biomedicine and bioethics.49 
Last but not least, one of the biggest problems faced by international biomedical law is the lack of 
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legally binding norms, on which the whole ILC’s Report seemed to be focused.50 This last feature of 
biomedical law requires considerable attention. 
 
c) Relative normativity51 of international biomedical law? 
 
What characterises biomedical law at the international level is a general lack of legally binding 
norms – the so called hard law – alongside an overwhelming proliferation of soft law instruments. 
The term ‘hard law’ as used in this special issue refers to legally binding obligations which are 
precise and which delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.52 For the 
mainstream international (positivist) lawyer hard law includes rules that are both formal and 
enforceable. Reliance on coercion – understood as diplomatic measures, reprisals or dispute 
settlement – is crucial.  In addition to requiring commitment to a background set of legal norms – 
including engagement in established legal processes and discourse – legalization provides actors 
with a means to instantiate normative values.53 Treaties are by definition always hard law, because 
they are always binding, although an agreement involving states may still be binding in the absence 
                                                 
50
 That conceptual frame constituting a starting point for the ILC’s Report was provided by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), signed at Vienna on 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 
Jan 1980, United Nations, Treaty Series, 1155: 331. 
51
 A graduate normative hierarchy developed in international law, i.e. normative gradations amongst rules of 
international law exemplified, in particular, by the concepts of jus cogens and soft law. See:  P. Weil. Towards 
relative normativity in international law?, The American journal of international law 1983; 77, 413-442; 
U.Fastenrath. Relative Normativity in International Law, European Journal International Law 1993; 4: 305-340. 
52
 F. Snyder. 1993. Soft law and Institutional Practice in the European Community. In: The Construction of 
Europe – Essays in honour of Emile Noel, S. Martin (ed), Kluwer Academic Publishers: 197-225: 198. 
53
 S. Spiliopoulou Åkermark 2004. Soft Law and International Financial Institutions – Issues of Hard and Soft 
Law from a Lawyer’s Perspective, In: Soft Law in Governance and Regulation– An Interdisciplinary Analysis, 
U.Mörth (ed), Edward Elgar: 61-101: 77-78. 
 16 
of a treaty, so the distinction between soft and hard law is not simply synonymous with the 
distinction between treaties and non-treaties.54  
The realm of ‘soft law’ is much more elusive as it begins once legal arrangements are 
weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation. This 
softening can occur in varying degrees along each dimension and in different combinations across 
dimensions.55 Thus, the term ‘soft law’ can be ascribed different meanings. The most common 
distinction between hard and soft law norms is that soft law lacks the possibility of legal sanctions.56  
In this respect it could be summarized as: ‘the rules of conduct that find themselves on the legally 
non-binding level (…), but which according to the intention of its authors indeed do possess legal 
scope, which has to be further defined in each case.’57 Alternatively, however, rather than being 
simply non-binding, soft law can be viewed to include open-textured norms of general content and 
wording, i.e. ‘principles’, rather than specific commitments. In this sense treaties, regarded by 
Public International Law as binding, can be either soft or hard, or both, as exemplified by the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights.58 The Charter used to lack legal force, and hence was seen as ‘soft 
law’ in the common sense of the term. However, it has recently been elevated to the same status 
as the EU treaties. Nevertheless, because its chapter on solidarity refers to principles and values 
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rather than rights and duties, it might still be considered (at least partly) a soft law document.59 
Finally, another understanding of soft law can focus on the avoidance of compulsory adjudication or 
disputes. To sum up, soft law rules do not have in common a uniform standard of intensity as far as 
their legal scope is concerned, but they do share a desire to influence the practice of states, 
international organisations and individuals. They contain an element of law-making intention and 
progressive development, but without containing international legal rights and obligations.60 It is 
clear from the above definition that the term soft law can, therefore, be used to distinguish a broad 
class of deviations from hard law on the one hand and, on the other hand, from purely political 
arrangements in which legalization is largely absent.  
Using the above classification it becomes clear that only regional organizations such as the 
Council of Europe and the EU have been able to produced hard law instruments directly concerning 
biomedicine. While the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine together with its Additional 
Protocols remains the only international treaty in the field,61 the EU has incorporated explicit 
provisions concerning biomedicine into its primary and secondary law.62 The only other legally 
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binding instruments that might have a bearing on the field of biomedicine are the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity63 accompanied by the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety64, and the WHO International Health Regulations as well as, however indirectly, the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control65 along with general human rights treaties, such as the 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Social Economic and Cultural Rights66. 
And yet, even this limited group of legally binding instruments contains many open-textured, i.e. soft 
law provisions. For instance, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and other WHO 
instruments still neglect rights-based nomenclature.67 These considerations suggest that the field of 
biomedical law at the global level is predominantly ‘soft’, in that it is dominated by declarations, 
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communications, recommendations, resolutions, codes of practice, guidelines, notices, and 
positions.68  
Soft law has been widely criticized and even dismissed as a factor in international law. Prosper 
Weil, for example, argued as early as 1983 that increasing use of soft law ‘might destabilize the 
whole international normative system and turn it into an instrument that can no longer serve its 
purpose.’69 Critics usually focus on the absence of an independent judiciary with supporting 
enforcement powers, and the weaker credibility of their commitments.70 In the field of biomedical 
law lack of legally binding international instruments enables interested parties such as tourists-
scientists, patients and industries to ‘pick and choose’ from a patchwork of regulation containing a 
wide spectrum of possible options. Such freedom may contribute to the more efficient diffusion of 
controversial technologies and new regulatory regimes without conceding time for their cultural 
elaboration.71 Health risks and ethical problems are complex and the reaction to them may be 
culturally based. The result may be both a lack of constructive diversity and a lack of cultural and 
democratic legitimacy. It may also lead to larger inequalities and a kind of moral imperialism. 
Paradoxically, it might be easier to impose norms and values through ethical and professional 
codes of practice rather than through binding international treaties, which have to be negotiated in 
accordance with formal procedures and which treat all parties as sovereign equals.72  
To sum up, the multiplicity of political, legal and other forms of public decision-making, 
developed to address the complexities of specialised knowledge, tend to lack some of the qualities 
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of democratic participation, transparency, stability, accountability and effectiveness. These values 
are justificatory grounds of formal procedural requirements in decision-making, and explain why so 
many lawyers feel extremely uneasy when confronted with the notion of soft law where it indicates 
a lack of institutionalized adoption procedures. Legal rules must also observe legitimacy. 
Legitimacy in a normative sense entails the coherence of the legal system; that the rule respects 
other fundamental rules and principles.73 These are the main reasons for a structural and technical 
demand for harmonisation and compatibility.74  
Over the last decade a great deal of time has been devoted to finding adequate solutions to the 
above mentioned problems. Proposals, already mentioned in this paper include calls for 
harmonisation through international codes of practice75, centralisation76, and institutionalisation 
through new, formalised frameworks of international collaboration, institutions and legal practices, 
including codification and implementation of treaty law.77 Other scholars, such as Thomas Faunce, 
called for subsumption of medical ethics under international human rights law. He argued that ‘[the] 
human rights system is established to generate globally top-down normative guidelines and 
therefore, is more effective and more legitimate than reliance on the professional standards 
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departments of national medical associations or even the WMA.’78 As medicine is globalised, and 
as medical research in particular is globalised, there is strong pressure for universal norms both to 
allow practices to be evaluated transnationally and to allow for cross-border treatment, multinational 
clinical trials, trade in goods and services and so on.79 Although this argument rests on a false 
assumption that human rights law has clear implementation and enforcement mechanisms, it 
reflects the more widely held view, that not only biomedical governance requires legalisation, but 
also that the current domination of soft law instruments is just an interim phase in the development 
of customary and then conventional international law. Francesco Francioni’s words constitute a 
good example of the latter argumentation:  
 
‘[The Universal Declaration on Human Genome] is not a binding treaty. Its text can at best be 
understood to reflect emerging principles of international law which, expressed in the soft-law form 
of the Declaration, are designed to model the evolution of customary law and to eventually harden 
into more detailed and exacting standards. In any event, it is difficult to deny that the Declaration 
has already affected the opinion iuris of the international community.’80 
In line with those arguments is the view that we are witnessing the emergence of a new regime 
of international biomedical law. According to Roberto Andorno ‘the main distinguishing feature of 
this new emerging field of international law is the very central role it gives to the notion of human 
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dignity.’81 Such assertions are very rarely explicitly expressed by legal scholars, but they often 
constitute either an implicit assumption concerning the status quo, or a prescriptive statement for 
the future development of international biomedical law.82 However, such interpretations still stay 
within the classic conceptions of international law and seem not to take into consideration the 
complexities of the contemporary globalised world. Soft law may be identified not only as a phase in 
the process of legalisation, but also as an alternative, to more formal sets of law.83 It may be in the 
interests of the parties to keep to a less legalized relationship, providing for the possibility of 
compromise in terms of cost-effectiveness, pluralism and flexibility.84 One theory that takes into 
account these complexities is the theory of global legal pluralism, inspired by the sociological theory 
of Niklas Luhmann, and developed by Günter Teubner. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL BIOMEDICAL LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
 
According to Luhmann, modern societies are seen as emerging via generalised functional and 
communicative systems which traverse society – irrespective of territorial and institutional 
boundaries – such as economics, politics, law, sciences, religion, art, etc. None of the 
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communicative systems are privileged or seen as the centre of society.85 They are simultaneously 
characterised by both normative autonomy and complex relations and their interdependencies. At 
the global level, the combination of the globalisation of markets, international treaties, and new 
technologies (e.g. telecommunication and genetics) may lead to more comprehensive global 
dynamics in several fields than previously existed. Science and knowledge and the discourses 
related to these are part of what might be called ‘transnational dynamics’86. Teubner’s idea is that 
‘an autonomous network of legal communications has arisen that produces its inventory of norms 
primarily from a plurality of transnational processes of rule-making.’87 Therefore, Teubner rejects 
the constitutional response to fragmentation taken by the ILC. In his view, legal fragmentation is 
only a legal reproduction of collisions between the diverse rationalities within global society itself. 
Global pluralism is not simply a result of political pluralism, but is instead the expression of deep 
contradictions between colliding sectors of global society. Thus, any aspirations to a normative 
unity of a global law are doomed from the outset.88  
There is an assumption that law has established itself globally as a unitary social system 
beyond national laws. However, the unity of global law is not based on consistency of legal norms, 
structurally secured by the hierarchy of courts.89 The notion of legal system refers to various 
processes of self-organisation and self-coordination on the global level: a) the incremental forming 
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of conventions (e.g. lex mercatoria90), b) the reception of internal standards set by networks of 
companies, organisations and regulatory agencies (e.g. world-wide standardisation processes), c) 
rules emerging from market relations (e.g. contracts between global players) and so on. ‘The 
relations between international, supranational and transnational levels are varied, and can be 
described by interdependence and combinations, rather than hierarchical orders. This can be seen 
as a new poly-centricity and poly-contextuality in law, where unity in the old sense does not exist, 
and where interdependence, diversity, fragmentation and legal conflicts have emerged more clearly 
as qualities of legal regimes.’91 Therefore, Inger-Johanne Sand – a follower of Teubner – argues 
that ‘instead of the observation of the formal procedures, we must explore diverse approaches to 
contextualized legitimation of transnational regimes through techniques, such as deliberative 
supranationalism and democratic experimentalism’.92 In Teubner’s world of global legal pluralism 
we must grapple with laws that do not give rise to a single ‘ultimate rule of recognition’ and 
‘decisions [which] are only “final” within the meaning of each specific system’.93 
To explain his vision of global law populated by interrelated autonomous regimes, Teubner 
uses the example of lex mercatoria. However, his analysis seems incredibly applicable to 
international biomedical law. According to Teubner, lex mercatoria consists of broad principles that 
change in their application from case to case. This is one of the reasons why some lawyers reject 
its existence as law altogether. This rejection is ill-founded; it seeks a body of rules as the ‘essence’ 
of an autonomous legal order, instead of looking for a communicative process that moves the 
symbol of validity according to the binary code. It is more a law of values and principles than a law 
of structures and rules. Teubner argues that its softness should not be seen as a deficiency, but as 
a typical characteristic of global law. It compensates for the lack of global enforceability, rendering it 
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suited to a global unification of law, remaining at the same time relatively resistant to symbolic 
destruction in the case of deviance.94 In this respect, it should not come as a surprise that the area 
of medical treatment and research that has evolved both internationally and transnationally has 
been recognised by Sand as a transnational regulatory system of its own. 95 The theory of global 
legal pluralism allows for a much wider, complex and comprehensive conceptualisation of 
biomedical law at the international, transnational and national level; a conceptualisation that allows 
for a more systematic acknowledgement of the prominence of soft law and non-law rules. This new 
all-embracing concept should be called ‘global biomedical law’.  
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS: STUDIES INTO GLOBAL BIOMEDICAL LAW? 
 
Contemporary society is increasingly viewed as a network rather than a structure and an 
‘infinite volume of permanent permutations’.96 It is governed by a multitude of normative layers. 
Consequently, our definitions of governance are changing. There is an increased focus on the 
variety of techniques of governance being extended from law and politics to include economic, 
scientific, technological and ethical techniques, among others, which illustrates the change of focus 
from politico-legal institutions to the increasing significance of a variety of communicative functions 
or techniques.97 In fact, the creation of new knowledge can be seen as a de facto form of 
governance and regulation in itself. It may be argued that knowledge and scientifically-based 
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discourses are taking over parts of the normative functions of law.98 Although international 
governance has become increasingly legalized throughout the 20th century, legalization is not 
binary. That is, international law is not simply present or absent in a given issue area. The situation 
is much more complex, as legalization is seen more as a continuum, moving from “soft” law to 
“hard” law. Finally there is the increasing diversity and differentiation of types of actors involved in 
governance. 99 The emphasis is on co-ordination, collaboration, and networks among several 
actors, as well as on seeing decision-making as part of a more comprehensive and varied process. 
At the same time, the question inevitably presents itself as to how we ought to draw the line 
between official law and non-official law, between hard and soft law, ultimately between law and 
non-law.100 Should we accept that in the place of universalist presumptions and procedures aiming 
at consensus, there are learning processes, collaborations, comparisons and an acceptance for 
disagreements and ambiguity where ‘meaning’ is attempted in complex areas.101 However, such 
conceptualisation of global biomedical law still leaves us with the issue of who and how takes the 
ultimate decision about what is right or/and legal in the particular case. Drafting translegal 
perspectives such as those of Teubner onto the biomedical arena helps to re-imagine the 
challenge. Arguably such a view is more particularly relevant to a field so sensitive to issues of 
culture, faith, and the very generation of humanity itself. Here theoretical constructs reach the limits 
of their abilities, leaving space for social scientific investigation.  It would be interesting and 
productive to explore the ways in which different actors construct the relationship between different 
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normative instruments, and the ways various kinds of professional and civil servant use the different 
‘languages’ and rationalities for different purposes in different contexts. What causes one norm to 
be followed rather than another? What impact do soft law norms created by international 
governmental and non-governmental organisations have on the scientific community and national 
regulators? Francis Fukuyama aptly pointed out that: ‘[a]ll international institutions face the same 
design tradeoffs…: institutions that are regarded as legitimate… are not terribly effective, while 
those that are effective are not regarded as legitimate’.102 Such research should hopefully help 
resolve this paradox and allow for a more coherent development of the global biomedical law in the 
future. 
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